Section C: International Option The League of Nations and international relations in the 1930s Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question. Source A The Führer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question would be cleared up in due course by Germany. Difficulties connected with the Empire, and the prospect of involvement in a long European war, were decisive considerations for Britain against participation in a war against Germany. Britain's attitude would certainly not be without influence on that of France. An attack by France without British support, and with the prospect of the offensive being brought to a standstill on our western fortifications, was hardly probable. The annexation of Czechoslovakia offers us a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new armed units. From the Hossbach Memorandum, reporting Hitler's speech at a secret meeting in November 1937. Hossbach attended the meeting and wrote this report from memory five days later. Source B If we were to accept without protest such an explicit violation of the Munich Agreement, it might lead to a doubt as to the good faith of Britain and France. Its whole justification was, by liberating the Sudetenland, to safeguard the independence and integrity of the rest of Czechoslovakia. The enforced submission of the Prague government, brutally imposed by German pressure, cannot be used to excuse Great Britain and France from their moral obligation in the eyes of their own people and of those of other states, as well as of the Czechoslovak nation. Please make sure that the British government agrees that the British and French representatives should immediately take concerted action in Berlin. From a letter from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Ambassador in London, 16 March 1939. Source C Last autumn, I felt, by mutual goodwill, it should be possible to resolve all differences by discussion and without armed conflict. Herr Hitler himself said: 'I have assured Mr. Chamberlain I shall not be interested in the Czech state anymore, and I can guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs anymore.' In the Munich Agreement, which bears Herr Hitler's signature, there is this clause: 'The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission.' We are told that this seizure of territory has been necessitated by disturbances in Czechoslovakia. Germany, under its present regime, has sprung a series of unpleasant surprises upon the world. The Rhineland, the Anschluss, the severance of Sudetenland – all these shocked and affronted public opinion throughout the world. Yet, however much we might take exception to the methods in each of those cases, there was something to be said, whether on account of race or of fair claims too long resisted, for the necessity of a change in the existing situation. But the events which have taken place this week in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German government itself seem to fall into a different category. Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force? From a public speech by Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, 17 March 1939. Source D The events of 14–15 March confirmed the correctness of the policies Chamberlain and Daladier had followed in the Czech question, which explains the total lack of reaction in the western democracies to the collapse of the former Czechoslovakia. Naturally the professional warmongers in the hostile German-hating lying press are stuttering out a few emotional insults against Germany, but none of them is of any political significance. Nothing can change the facts, and it is evidence of the growing realisation of this in the western democracies that no significant figure is raising any objection. The justice of Germany's position is too clear to be disputed. From 'Great Days', an article in the official Nazi newspaper by Goebbels, 18 March 1939. Answer both parts of the question with reference to the sources.

Mark scheme

Marking points from the official mark scheme (Feb/Mar 2021). The mark or mark type is shown in brackets.

1. Differences: Source A shows Hitler believed that the 'annexation of Czechoslovakia' would take place at least as early as 1937; in Source C, Hitler's promises at Munich, in 1938, that ‘We don't want any Czechs any more' are recorded.
2. Differences: The motive for the invasion was because of 'disturbances in Czechoslovakia' in Source C but to bring advantages for Germany in Source A.
3. Similarities: Hitler's true intentions are clear in both sources; his plan in Source A, to take over Czechoslovakia, is carried out in Source C, as Germany has invaded.
4. Similarities: Both sources indicate the takeover is part of a bigger plan; Hitler's attitude in 1937 is that Czechoslovakia is part of a wider plan and talks of the advantages in terms of further expansion and 'the freeing of forces for other purposes', while in Source C, even Chamberlain wonders whether this is the start of 'an attempt to dominate the world'.
5. Context/evaluation: Source A is taken from the Hossbach Memorandum. Hossbach was present at the secret meeting which took place in 1937. Hitler's motives for invasion are set out clearly in Source A, there were considerable strategic, military and economic advantages. Trouble among German citizens was clearly a spurious reason, recycled from the campaign to destabilise the Sudetenland the previous year. Candidates may note that this source takes place before the Anschluss with Austria in 1938.
6. Context/evaluation: The words of Hitler at the time of Munich (Source C) were clearly intended to placate the western democracies, and proved to be unreliable, as Chamberlain realises in March 1939. This source is after a very public meeting and other expansion by Hitler.
7. Context/evaluation: Accept any other valid responses.
8. Indicative content (Support): Source B supports, as it indicates that the French felt that they and the British, as guarantors of Czech independence at Munich, cannot 'accept without protest' the Germany invasion, without damage to their reputations. However, the obligation is identified as 'moral' rather than military. There is mention of diplomats from both countries taking 'concerted action' in Berlin.
9. Indicative content (Support): Source C mostly supports the view, as it shows indignation with Hitler for breaking his pledges at Munich, and in particular asserts that any changes in Czech frontiers should ‘be carried out by the international commission'. Chamberlain also indicates the fear that the German takeover of Czechoslovakia might reveal Hitler's intention 'to dominate the world by force'.
10. Indicative content (Challenge): Source A challenges the view. Hitler is predicting that 'almost certainly Britain, and probably France' had 'written off' Czechoslovakia and would not oppose German actions there. He shows his awareness of public reluctance to see another war, and also that, on strategic grounds, an attack on Germany's 'western fortifications' would be seen as too likely to end up with the 'offensive being brought to a standstill'.
11. Indicative content (Challenge): Source C challenges the view to some extent as there is no clear proposal for how opposition will be shown. Chamberlain refers to his previous hope 'to resolve all differences by discussion' and understanding for Hitler's actions: 'there was something to be said for the necessity of a change'.
12. Indicative content (Challenge): Source D challenges the view. Goebbels asserts 'the total lack of reaction in the western democracies to the collapse of the former Czechoslovakia'. He mentions some opposition from the 'German-hating lying press' but maintains that the 'no significant figure is raising any objection'. He claims that this proves that Germany's actions were too just to be even 'disputed'.
13. Evaluation: Source A: Hitler knows about the pressures on the western democracies to avoid war and follow a path of appeasement and calculates this will extend to acceptance of Czechoslovakia being ‘cleared up in due course by Germany'. This belief was informed by the success of his armies' march into the Rhineland the previous year, when France had proved reluctant to act 'without British support', and Britain had made it clear that there was no appetite for becoming involved 'in a long European war'. This source provides a reliable indication of the views of Hitler at the time.
14. Evaluation: Source B: The French Government are making a strong protest, which was followed up by diplomats, and this can be cross-referenced with Source C to show the reaction that this was a new step for Hitler, as there was no justification to be claimed. However, this can be questioned because the French have failed to act for so long – it is now rather late in the day. The only military response by the French was a decision to speed up rearmament.
15. Evaluation: Source C: This speech marks a new determination from Chamberlain to assert British opposition to German aggression and can be seen as the end of the policy of appeasement. The Prime Minister's initial response, in his announcement to parliament, had been criticised for its lack of conviction. Although he is angrier in this source, he still makes excuses for some of Hitler's actions suggesting they are reasonable. In many ways this source acts as an excuse for lack of action up to this point. While nothing could be done to save Czechoslovakia, this speech will be followed by a specific guarantee to Poland (29th March), which was finally acted upon with the declaration of war in September 1939.
16. Evaluation: Source D: This is a piece of propaganda from Goebbels, refusing to accept that there was any valid opposition, and lying about the response of the British and French, who were making strongly worded protests, as indicated by Source B. In his reference to Chamberlain and Daladier, he is suggesting that the events are a logical continuation of the agreement over the Sudetenland at Munich. The article, in the Nazi newspaper, aims to convince the German public that action against Czechoslovakia was fully justified, and that France and Britain would not challenge German expansion. However, this is not a valid piece of evidence about the views of GB and France at this time. Goebbels is more interested in convincing his own people rather than truthfully portraying the views of other countries.
17. Evaluation: The sources show that the Nazi violation of the Munich Agreement, by attacking the remainder of Czechoslovakia, marked a shift to clearer opposition from France (Source B) and Britain (Source C), although still only expressed in words at this point. Hitler's prediction (Source A), and Goebbels' propaganda (Source D) are inaccurate in this respect, although the expressions of protest from the western democracies did nothing to stop the successful German invasion of Czechoslovakia.
18. Evaluation: Accept any other valid responses.