Section C: International option Empire and the emergence of world powers, 1870–1919 Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question. Source A The friendship of the United States is appreciated by Japan, and we have derived great benefits from it throughout this deplorable war. Japan does not seek territorial expansion nor dictatorial supremacy; our policy in East Asia will be in exact agreement with Britain and the United States. We intend for our own good and the good of the world to cooperate in forcing upon Korea and China the same benefits of modern development that have, in the past, been forced upon us. We have no more selfish motive than a simple desire for our own commercial and educational betterment. China and Korea are both atrociously misgoverned. They are in the hands of corrupt officials whose ignorance and narrow-mindedness are a menace to political stability in the region. These conditions we will endeavour to correct at the earliest possible date, by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary. From 'Japan's Policy Abroad', an article in the New York Times by the Japanese prime minister, July 1905. Source B President Roosevelt called upon Japan and Russia, in the name of humanity, to meet at Portsmouth to discuss terms of peace. The Tokyo government, after long discussion, decided upon a generous course, which at once won the applause of the whole civilised world. It conceded every point in dispute, gave up its demand for reparations, gave up half of the island of Sakhalin, and, though triumphantly victorious in the war, accepted terms of peace dictated by the nation it had conquered, all 'in the name of humanity'. Russia had won the victory on the face of it, but the historian will credit to Japan the greater and the real victory, a victory of vast moral and humanitarian significance. The Treaty of Portsmouth brought to an end a struggle that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, billions of dollars and completely changed the political power in East Asia. From 'The Japan–Russia War', by a British war correspondent, published in 1905. Source C I resolved to base my tactics on winning the sympathy of the Americans. From Portsmouth, I sent a telegram to our Foreign Minister: ‘Peace-loving public opinion will recognise that Russia was right in refusing to pay war reparations. It will not side with us on Sakhalin, which is in the hands of the Japanese, and which we have no means to recover.' Until the last day of the Conference I was still in the dark as to whether the Japanese would sign. My sleep was filled with nightmares. The Treaty of Portsmouth was a heavy blow to our national pride. President Roosevelt's sympathies were with the Japanese. To enhance his own popularity for having called for the conference, he wanted peace, but a peace advantageous for the Japanese. It did not occur to him that a Japan set on increasing its strength was not exactly to the best interests of the United States. From the memoirs of Russia's negotiator at the Portsmouth Conference, published in 1921. Source D In Washington there was a growing uneasiness. President Roosevelt wrote, 'If Japan is careful, it can become one of the leaders of the family of great nations; but if Japan tries to gain from its victory in the Russo-Japanese War more than it should, it will provoke all the great powers, and it cannot successfully face an allied world.' Early in October 1905 I was sent to join my father, who was an observer of the Russo-Japanese War, to measure the strength of the Japanese Army. I met all the great Japanese commanders: grim, silent, aloof men of iron character and unshakeable purpose. But I had the uneasy feeling that the proud leaders were, through their victories, planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of East Asia. Having conquered Korea and Formosa, they would eventually strike for control of the Pacific and domination of East Asia. From the memoirs of US General Douglas MacArthur, 1964.

Mark scheme

Marking points from the official mark scheme (Feb/Mar 2023). The mark or mark type is shown in brackets.

1. [15] Both sources talk about the involvement of President Roosevelt as having called the conference which led to the Treaty.
2. [15] Both sources are aware of the need to gain public approval for their stance; the Japanese 'won the applause of the whole civilised world' while the Russian speaks of 'winning the sympathy of the Americans' and 'peace-loving public opinion'.
3. [15] Both sources suggest that Japan is the victor in one way or another.
4. [15] There is a fundamental difference about which country benefited. In Source B, Japan is seen as having 'conceded every point in dispute' and accepted limited gains despite having won the war; ‘Russia had won the victory on the face of it' at the Treaty. In Source C, the Russians regard the Treaty of Portsmouth as 'a heavy blow to our national pride' as it was 'a peace advantageous for the Japanese'.
5. [15] Source C says that 'Sakhalin is in the hands of the Japanese, and we have no means to recover', while Source B indicates that Japan 'gave up half of the island of Sakhalin'.
6. [15] The writer of Source C is clearly sympathetic to Japan: Britain was allied with Japan from 1902, whereas there were tensions between Britain and Russia over India and the Far East. Each side had spent about a million dollars per day on the war and faced financial crisis. Whereas in Source D the Russian negotiator's awareness of the importance of behaving tactically, as well as the anxiety of the process, are evident here. He sees the negative impact of the war on Russia's status. He is trying to show his achievements in a challenging context.
7. [15] Accept any other valid responses.
8. [25] Source A: This implies some support when the Japanese prime minister writes of 'forcing upon Korea and China' the 'benefits of modern development'. This will be 'by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary'.
9. [25] Source C: It talks of 'a Japan set on increasing its strength' not being 'the best interests of America', implying challenges to American interests in East Asia. It also confirms the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin.
10. [25] Source D: The American general speaks of the strength of the Japanese armed forces. The threat is seen as a future one 'planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of East Asia'. This is linked to the quotation of Roosevelt's warning to Japan, and the reference to 'a growing uneasiness' in Washington.
11. [25] Source A: It directly states 'Japan does not seek territorial aggrandisement nor dictatorial supremacy'.
12. [25] Source B: It describes Japan as 'generous' and peaceful, willing to give up possible gains of war 'in the name of humanity'. However, it does acknowledge that the war 'completely changed the political power in East Asia'.
13. [25] Source A: The Japanese prime minister shows Japan is willing to follow the US and European example in his rather ominous claim that he is merely forcing on its neighbours 'same benefits of modern development that have been in the past forced upon us'. He thus demonstrates a clear desire to dominate the area. There is no reason to think that this is not his policy although it should be considered that he is writing for an American audience.
14. [25] Source B: The Russo-Japanese war marked the emergence of Japan as a recognised military force, although this source indicates that Japan was not able to capitalise on this by direct gains at the Treaty of Portsmouth. The author shows a very positive view of Japanese policy, perhaps linked to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the belief that the interests of the two nations in East Asia coincided. Japan's concessions were less positively regarded by the Japanese public; there were protests and rioting in Tokyo when the details of the Treaty were published.
15. [25] Source C: This Russian negotiator is keen to assert his diplomatic skills in the face of what he sees as US partiality for Japan, and also to warn of the consequences of this for future Japanese dominance of East Asia. This viewpoint can undermine the validity of the source. The fact that he is writing in 1921 also means that he may be reading more into the situation as the relationship has developed.
16. [25] Source D: McArthur sees Japan as an emerging threat, but clearly speaks with hindsight – by 1964 his career was largely over, and he is commenting from the side-lines. He was commander of all Allied forces in the Pacific at the end of the Second World War, and officially accepted Japan's surrender in 1945.
17. [25] Accept any other valid responses.