Section C: International option Empire and the emergence of world powers, 1870–1919 Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question. Source A The friendship of the United States is appreciated by Japan, and we have derived great benefits from it throughout this deplorable war. Japan does not seek territorial expansion nor dictatorial supremacy; our policy in East Asia will be in exact agreement with Britain and the United States. We intend for our own good and the good of the world to cooperate in forcing upon Korea and China the same benefits of modern development that have, in the past, been forced upon us. We have no more selfish motive than a simple desire for our own commercial and educational betterment. China and Korea are both atrociously misgoverned. They are in the hands of corrupt officials whose ignorance and narrow-mindedness are a menace to political stability in the region. These conditions we will endeavour to correct at the earliest possible date, by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary. From 'Japan's Policy Abroad', an article in the New York Times by the Japanese prime minister, July 1905. Source B President Roosevelt called upon Japan and Russia, in the name of humanity, to meet at Portsmouth to discuss terms of peace. The Tokyo government, after long discussion, decided upon a generous course, which at once won the applause of the whole civilised world. It conceded every point in dispute, gave up its demand for reparations, gave up half of the island of Sakhalin, and, though triumphantly victorious in the war, accepted terms of peace dictated by the nation it had conquered, all 'in the name of humanity'. Russia had won the victory on the face of it, but the historian will credit to Japan the greater and the real victory, a victory of vast moral and humanitarian significance. The Treaty of Portsmouth brought to an end a struggle that cost hundreds of thousands of lives, billions of dollars and completely changed the political power in East Asia. From 'The Japan–Russia War', by a British war correspondent, published in 1905. Source C I resolved to base my tactics on winning the sympathy of the Americans. From Portsmouth, I sent a telegram to our Foreign Minister: ‘Peace-loving public opinion will recognise that Russia was right in refusing to pay war reparations. It will not side with us on Sakhalin, which is in the hands of the Japanese, and which we have no means to recover.' Until the last day of the Conference I was still in the dark as to whether the Japanese would sign. My sleep was filled with nightmares. The Treaty of Portsmouth was a heavy blow to our national pride. President Roosevelt's sympathies were with the Japanese. To enhance his own popularity for having called for the conference, he wanted peace, but a peace advantageous for the Japanese. It did not occur to him that a Japan set on increasing its strength was not exactly to the best interests of the United States. From the memoirs of Russia's negotiator at the Portsmouth Conference, published in 1921. Source D In Washington there was a growing uneasiness. President Roosevelt wrote, 'If Japan is careful, it can become one of the leaders of the family of great nations; but if Japan tries to gain from its victory in the Russo-Japanese War more than it should, it will provoke all the great powers, and it cannot successfully face an allied world.' Early in October 1905 I was sent to join my father, who was an observer of the Russo-Japanese War, to measure the strength of the Japanese Army. I met all the great Japanese commanders: grim, silent, aloof men of iron character and unshakeable purpose. But I had the uneasy feeling that the proud leaders were, through their victories, planting the seed of eventual Japanese conquest of East Asia. Having conquered Korea and Formosa, they would eventually strike for control of the Pacific and domination of East Asia. From the memoirs of US General Douglas MacArthur, 1964.