Option B: Twentieth century topic WHO WAS MAINLY TO BLAME FOR THE LEAGUE'S FAILURE OVER ABYSSINIA? Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer all the questions. Background Information As the two leading members of the League of Nations, Britain and France are often blamed for the League's failure to deal with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. It has been argued that both were more interested in having Italy as an ally against the greater threat from Germany. Was Britain or France more to blame for the failure of the League to act against Italy? SOURCE A France's policy was in line with French national interests. Hitler's Germany was the potential enemy. Therefore Italy must be made an ally. In 1940 Baldwin claimed that Laval had been bought by Mussolini, but Laval would have followed the same policy without being bribed. In the face of the German danger, a British alliance would be of more value to France than an Italian one. But could it be obtained? It seemed strange to the French that the British should suddenly take seriously their obligations to the League over Abyssinia while not taking seriously their obligations to the League in relation to the German menace to France. It seemed clear in France, and indeed was the case, that Britain still hoped for a settlement with Germany and was not ready to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant. The disastrous Hoare-Laval Pact of December 1935 was a result of Hoare being concerned about the German menace, anxious to retain Italian friendship and reluctant to take collective action. The British government justified its limited actions in defence of Abyssinia by claiming that it was expected to take the lead and that it was the only country to take effective action. However, Britain was the leading European power so of course it was expected to take the lead. Many League members did enforce sanctions at a high economic price to themselves. One suspects that this criticism of 'others' was a way of saying that France would not play its part. However, Chamberlain said at the time, 'We had from France the most loyal assurances that they would come to our aid if we were attacked by Italy.' In reality Britain did not think the League could enforce international law and order. It thought of national safety as being dependent on alliances and the balance of power. The result was failure for the League. From a history book published in 1974. SOURCE B British and French policies were a futile escape from world responsibilities. They agreed about nothing. Britain saw the League as a way of revising the harsh terms of the peace treaties of 1919 while France wanted to use it to enforce the treaties. When the Assembly met in September 1935, the British foreign secretary, Hoare, strongly supported collective action against Italy. It seemed that Britain was prepared to uphold the League's authority even at the cost of war. In spite of its attempts to weaken the League's authority behind the scenes, France used the same language. However, privately it was pressing Britain to not support any sanctions which could make war inevitable. France was reluctant to apply oil sanctions, although these would have been fatal for Italy. Three days after the Italian invasion, the Council of the League formally declared Italy to have broken the Covenant. Unfortunately, French policy weakened the strength of the British stand. Laval strove to prevent the League deciding whether to cut off Italy's oil. By the beginning of December he had used Hoare's fears of a military clash with Italy to obtain agreement over the Hoare-Laval Pact which made nonsense of the League's stand. As the two great powers, Britain and France had to take the lead. But they also saw Italy as a potential ally against Germany. Neither wanted to alienate Mussolini, although this was more of a worry for France. Britain was more concerned about Germany. Despite these complications, it is difficult to envisage any outcome worse than that which actually resulted. The League was fatally damaged. From a recent history book.