Answer one question from one section only. Section C: International option China and Japan, 1912-45 Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question. Source A The people are more and more living in fear, afraid in business, afraid for their personal safety, afraid to join the church, because of the Japanese government's harassment of Christians. The policy of Japan, despite all claims to the outside world of love for China, is that its economic and military power should extend throughout China. There is no probability Japan will give up Shandong Province after the war, and who will be able to force Japan to do it? From being a debtor nation before the war, it has now become a creditor nation, vastly increasing its merchant fleet, as well as its army and navy under the slogan of self-defence. Japan's wealth and power have increased and, with this, so has its colossal arrogance and pride. From a report by an American missionary in Shandong, China, December 1917. Source B At the coming peace conference, in joining the League of Nations, Japan must insist that economic imperialism and discriminatory treatment of Orientals by Caucasians be rejected from the start. I fear Britain and America, which have profited most from the war, will promptly unify the world under their economic dominance, and will rule the world. They will use the League of Nations and arms limitations to serve their purpose. In such a case, the need to ensure its survival would compel Japan, which is limited in territory, and poor in natural resources, to attempt to challenge the situation as Germany did. From a pamphlet written in 1918 by a Japanese delegate to the Paris Peace Conference. Source C The feeling against the United States has revived and become intensified since the news reached Japan that the question of the Shandong Province had come up for consideration at the Peace Conference. Proposals have been made which Japan interprets as contrary to its interests and insulting to its dignity. The possibility of Great Britain and the United States working together is viewed in Japan with dismay. This is partly because this would threaten both the ambitious dreams of a Japanese dominance of Asia, which are cherished by the extremists, and the less absurd schemes of practical men for the exclusive exploitation of China. It is also because all Japanese see this union of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations as a menace of the gravest kind to the civilisation and culture of the Far East. From a British Foreign Office memorandum, 1919. Source D Japan is very willing indeed to agree to limitation of armaments. Japan has no aggressive intentions whatever and, although there may still be militarists in this country, the Japanese recognise that militarism is impossible. At the same time, it must obtain from the Powers recognition of its special rights in Manchuria and Siberia. This is not aggression in the least, but simply a condition of Japan's national existence. We must find a dumping ground for our surplus population and have access to other sources for the raw materials with which we are inadequately supplied. These are conditions necessary to ensure our national existence, and to demand special rights in the areas close to our borders is only right and proper. Japan's special duty at this stage is to get foreign powers to fully grasp the fact that it has no aggressive intentions. From a speech by a member of the Japanese Parliament to the Washington Naval Conference, November 1921.

Mark scheme

Marking points from the official mark scheme (May/June 2022). The mark or mark type is shown in brackets.

1. Similarities: Both show Japanese suspicion of US and British priorities at the peace conferences, and fear of these two powers combining to threaten Japan's interests.
2. Similarities: In both, economic considerations and questions of status (both use the term 'insulting') are explored.
3. Differences: Source B is particularly concerned about the Racial Equality Clause, which the Japanese government wanted included in the League Covenant, and which would prevent discrimination against Japanese immigrants, while Source C specifies 'the question of the Shandong Province', which was a former German territory in eastern China.
4. Differences: Source B shows complete sympathy for Japan, and indicates that 'the need to ensure its survival' may lead it to challenge the situation set up by the Paris Peace Conference. Source C suggests that Japan's suspicion of the actions of the US and Britain come from a determination to ensure its interests in Asia rather than their views of the Paris Peace Conference.
5. Explanation: These sources differ because they each show one of the two main preoccupations of the Japanese at the peace conference, the aspiration to take over German territories and the recognition of the principle of racial equality.
6. Explanation: They both indicate that Japan viewed the Americans and British as abusing their position of dominance at the conference to impede these aims. While the Paris conference gave Japan control over some German territories (including Shandong), others were transferred to Australia, New Zealand and Britain. The racial equality proposal gained majority support but Wilson ruled that it should not be included in the final agreement because unanimity had not been reached; it was the only time during the conference that this was insisted upon.
7. Explanation: In both cases, Japan was suspicious of the motives behind these decisions, which included British aims to strengthen its empire and not to concede equal rights to other races within it, and Wilson's dependence on the votes of Southern Democrats, who supported racial segregation, to push the treaty of Versailles through Congress.
8. Explanation: The broad agreement between the two sources, written by a Japanese delegate and the British Foreign Office, strengthens the evidence that the Japanese felt slighted and threatened by the western powers.
9. Explanation: Accept any other valid responses.
10. Support: Source A supports the view, as it describes Japanese aggression in Shandong, and determination to retain the possession. The writer believes that Japan intends to extend military, as well as economic, influence 'throughout China'. Japan is described as having become richer and better armed as a result of the war.
11. Support: Source B supports the view to a more limited extent, as it explains that Japan 'is limited in territory, and poor in natural resources' and may need to challenge western dominance in order 'to ensure its survival'.
12. Support: Source C largely supports the view. While 'the ambitious dreams of a Japanese dominance of Asia' may be confined to extremists, there are more general plans for 'the exclusive exploitation of China'. These may, however, be seen as more concerned with economic influence rather than clear aggression. Any questioning of Japanese rights in Shandong is also regarded as 'as contrary to its interests and insulting to its dignity', showing Japan's assertion of its international status.
13. Support: Source D does show some support. There is repetition of the demand for 'special rights in Manchuria and Siberia', justified by surplus population and the need for raw materials
14. Challenge: Source B offers challenge, as it expresses the fear that it is Britain and America who intend to 'rule the world'.
15. Challenge: Source D challenges the view. The writer twice emphasises that Japan has 'no aggressive intentions' and recognises that 'militarism is impossible'.
16. Evaluation: The missionary in Source A is writing as an outsider, but his views are clearly shaped by his sympathy for the Chinese inhabitants of Shandong, where he lives, and more particularly by the threat he sees the Japanese as posing to his missionary activity. He mistrusts Japanese actions ('despite all claims to the outside world of love for China'), is suspicious about their motives ('the slogan of self-defence') and shows overt hostility when describing their 'colossal arrogance and pride'. He makes points about war fuelling both economic growth and Japanese influence in China.
17. Evaluation: Source B shows the Japanese determination to assert their rights, to challenge western racial discrimination and assumptions about dominance. Japan had played an important role in World War I by combatting German naval forces in the Pacific, capturing German-controlled territories in China, supplying arms and ammunition to the Allies and patrolling sections of the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. The Japanese delegates to the peace conferences felt this should be acknowledged, and were offended by the obvious racism and by Allied attempts to thwart Japan's expansionist ambitions, seen as motivated by British and American wishes to protect their own imperial possessions in Asia and the Pacific.
18. Evaluation: Source C indicates British suspicion of Japanese plans for expansion, either economic or military, into China. A clear clash of interests is behind this – the British were concerned that Japanese expansion might threaten their access to Chinese markets, and their colonial possessions, while Japan politicians were convinced that they needed the resources of China. The American policy of the Open Door, as set out by Hay in 1899, declared that the foreign powers in China must observe a policy of free economic competition. A combination of the western powers was likely to frustrate Japanese claims. Only when the Italian Prime Minister Orlando left the conference in protest over Wilson's unwillingness to grant Italy the territory of Fiume, did Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary, defy Wilson and negotiate a confirmation of Japan's control over Shandong.
19. Evaluation: Source D is the view of Japanese moderates at the time. There was a widely-held conviction that Japan's minimal resource base and large population meant expansion was essential to continue industrialisation, but many also questioned the militarism that was seen as a reaction to western aggression, and to foreign influences damaging to China.
20. Evaluation: Taken together, the sources show the Japanese determination to assert their right to occupy and economically exploit some neighbouring territories. Sources B and D, however, written by Japanese diplomats, clearly indicate that many Japanese considered that it was the US and Great Britain who were aggressively asserting their international status. The prevalence of this view in Japan is also confirmed by the British Foreign Office in Source C.
21. Evaluation: Accept any other valid responses.