Option B: Twentieth Century topic WAS BRITAIN RIGHT NOT TO ACT OVER THE REMILITARISATION OF THE RHINELAND? Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer all the questions. Background Information When Germany sent its army into the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, it was breaking both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. Despite this, Britain and France did not intervene. Some politicians at the time such as Churchill, and some historians since, have argued that it was clear that Hitler was not going to limit his ambitions to the Rhineland, and that if Britain and France had acted in 1936 they could have stopped Hitler. Others argue that the British government had no choice but to try and appease Hitler because its armed forces were too weak to act and anyway there was little support within Britain for action against Germany. Was Britain justified in not taking firmer action over the Rhineland? SOURCE A Britain's policy over the Rhineland was understandable. From the beginning it wanted to prevent war. There was no possibility of Britain receiving military support from France. French politicians had ruled out the use of force, France's army was not capable of immediate action and French public opinion was opposed to it. For the French, the Rhineland was not worth fighting for. Nor was there any chance of British military action. Although they did not trust Hitler, British leaders were well aware that Britain was in no position to take military action against Germany. British public opinion would certainly not have supported any such action. The mood in Britain after the Abyssinian Crisis was more anti-French than anti-German. There was no desire to take on Hitler when in the eyes of many people he was simply entering 'his own backyard'. Government attempts to persuade the British public to accept rearmament had little success. The last thing the government wanted was a continental involvement that might alienate working-class voters and make it impossible to build agreement for strengthening national defences. The British government accepted the Rhineland was an important issue, but considered it more important to get on well with Germany. They believed Britain had too many enemies, and not enough resources to cope with them. All this made Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact very attractive. From a history book. SOURCE B As early as 3 March France was warning Britain about a future remilitarisation of the Rhineland and stated that, although it would immediately go to the League of Nations, it also reserved the right to take military action. Despite this, Britain entered the crisis over the Rhineland without any clear policy. For Britain the Rhineland was unimportant, so it decided not to resort to direct measures to reimpose demilitarisation. This meant appeasing Hitler. The British military chiefs tried to find every possible excuse to avoid war and members of the government were keen on accepting Hitler's non-aggression pact. However, he had no intention of keeping to it. Within government it was ridiculously argued that Hitler must be a sensible man, otherwise he would never have risen to his great position. The leaders of the government did not want war, and were naive enough to believe that, if they got around a table with Hitler, they would be able to come to terms and avoid war. There was much pro-German sentiment in Britain and despite the threat from Germany, the British government did little to make the British public aware of the necessity of rearmament. It believed Hitler's declarations were made in good faith and therefore missed the last opportunity to stop Hitler when his army was still too weak to fight a war. From a history book. SOURCE C A photograph of German troops marching into the Rhineland, March 1936. [Figure C.1] SOURCE D [Figure D.1] THE GOOSE-STEP. “GOOSEY GOOSEY GANDER, WHITHER DOST THOU WANDER?” “ONLY THROUGH THE RHINELAND– PRAY EXCUSE MY BLUNDER!” A cartoon published in a British magazine, 18 March 1936. SOURCE E We must discourage any military action by France against Germany. Germany could be called on to evacuate the Rhineland but such a demand should not be made unless the Powers who made it were prepared to enforce it by military action. Fortunately, Flandin has said that France will not act alone but will take the matter to the League of Nations. This he must be encouraged to do. The French public might get restless at such slow action and demand action of a military character. Such a development must be avoided if possible. While we cannot object to the Council declaring that Germany has violated the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, this is not to be followed by a French attack on Germany and a request for our armed assistance. But we must be ready to offer the French something as compensation for the tearing up of Versailles and Locarno. We might agree to a condemnation of Germany but we ought to resist an economic boycott. The essential thing will be to persuade France to accept negotiations with Germany. We are in a weak position because France can hold us to our Locarno obligations and call upon us to join in turning German forces out of the Rhineland. The strength of our position lies in the fact that France is not in the mood for military action of this sort. From a policy document presented by Eden to the rest of the British government, 8 March 1936. Eden was a member of the British government and in charge of foreign policy. Flandin was in charge of French foreign policy. SOURCE F The German Ambassador came to see me on the morning of 7 March and handed me a document which announces that the German government has restored the full sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland. The second part of the document contains a series of proposals which are designed to promote the establishment of a system of peaceful security for Europe. The French and Belgian governments have asked that the Council of the League of Nations may be summoned as soon as possible to consider the situation. I must emphasise that the Council of the League is the proper body for this purpose. There is no reason to suppose that the German action implies a threat of hostilities. The German government speaks of its 'unchangeable longing for a real peace in Europe' and expresses its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium. If peace is to be secured there is a duty to rebuild. It is in that spirit that we must approach the new proposals of the German Chancellor. Eden speaking in the British Parliament, 9 March 1936. SOURCE G At the end of January 1936, I was conscious of a new atmosphere in Britain. Mussolini's conquest of Abyssinia and the breakdown of 'Collective Security' had made the Labour Party and the public prepared to contemplate war against Nazi tyranny. Although the opposition parties continued to oppose rearmament, there was a measure of agreement and had the government risen to the occasion they could have led a united people forward. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland was a vital issue for France but they were unable to move without the support of Britain. However, they did not have any encouragement to resist German aggression from Britain. If the French army had mobilised there is no doubt Hitler would have had to withdraw. France alone was strong enough to drive the Germans out of the Rhineland. I warned the British government at the time that after the occupation of the Rhineland the incorporation of Austria into Germany was clearly the next step. From a book about the events leading up to the Second World War by Winston Churchill, published in 1948. The Labour Party was the opposition party in Britain. SOURCE H The whole world turns its eyes towards Britain. If Britain will act now it can lead Europe, and you will prevent war. It is your last chance. If you do not stop Germany now, it is all over. If you do not maintain the Treaty of Locarno, all that will remain for you to wait for is rearmament by Germany. If you do not stop Germany by force today, war is inevitable. Flandin speaking in a private meeting to British politicians, businessmen and journalists, 12 March 1936. Now answer all the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources. Study Sources A and B.